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CVE-2026-18414 zephyrproject CVE debrief

The ADI MAX32 driver in Zephyr did not properly validate the buffer size for sampling sequences, allowing a user-mode thread to cause kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, potentially leading to privilege escalation and denial of service. This issue arises from the driver's failure to ensure that samples are not written beyond the buffer limit, as documented in the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h. The vulnerability can be exploited by a user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object, leading to kernel-memory corruption and potential privilege escalation or denial of The

Vendor
zephyrproject
Product
zephyr
CVSS
HIGH 7.8
CISA KEV
Not listed in stored evidence
Original CVE published
2026-09-28
Original CVE updated
2026-10-27
Advisory published
2026-09-28
Advisory updated
2026-10-27

Who should care

Zephyr users and developers who utilize the ADI MAX32 driver should assess exposure and apply patches to prevent potential privilege escalation and denial of service. Additionally, security teams and operators should monitor system calls and ADC device object access for potential exploitation attempts. Affected operators and platforms should prioritize patching and verifying buffer validation and sampling sequence handling in the ADI MAX32 driver.

Why it matters

The ADI MAX32 driver vulnerability in Zephyr allows user-mode threads to corrupt kernel memory, potentially leading to privilege escalation and denial of service. Defenders should assess exposure, apply patches, and monitor system calls and ADC device object access.

  • Kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset.
  • Potential privilege escalation from an unprivileged user-mode thread.
  • Denial of service through targeted memory corruption.
  • Verification of buffer validation and sampling sequence handling in the ADI MAX32 driver.

Technical summary

The ADI MAX32 driver in Zephyr did not properly validate the buffer size for sampling sequences, allowing a user-mode thread to cause kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset. The driver failed to ensure that samples are not written beyond the buffer limit, as documented in the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h. This vulnerability can be exploited by a user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object, leading to kernel-memory corruption and potential privilege escalation or denial of service. The

Defensive priority

Apply patches from Zephyr project to fix the buffer validation issue in the ADI MAX32 driver.

Recommended defensive actions

  • Review and apply patches from Zephyr project to fix the buffer validation issue in the ADI MAX32 driver.
  • Verify buffer sizes and validation in the ADI MAX32 driver implementation.
  • Monitor system calls and ADC device object access for potential exploitation attempts.
  • Perform a thorough review of the ADI MAX32 driver code to ensure proper buffer validation and sampling sequence handling.
  • Implement compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified.
  • Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented.
  • Conduct regular security audits to identify potential vulnerabilities in the Zephyr project and apply patches promptly.

Evidence notes

The CVE record and NVD vulnerability detail provide information on the vulnerability, while the source references offer patch details. The ADI MAX32 driver vulnerability in Zephyr allows user-mode threads to corrupt kernel memory, potentially leading to privilege escalation and denial of service. Defenders should assess exposure, apply patches, and monitor system calls and ADC device object access. Evidence of exploitation attempts should be verified through system call monitoring and ADC device object access logs. The

Sources and references

Verified primary and authoritative sources

  • CVE-2026-18414 CVE Program record

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18414

    CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.

  • CVE-2026-18414 NVD vulnerability detail

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18414

    NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.

Supplemental references

  • Source reference

    Unverified legacy reference

    URL: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3bda971a52ddbbec28f6fcfe3b006d34e8b9e5a9

    [email protected] - Patch

  • Source reference

    Unverified legacy reference

    URL: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/9338c518bf2b6a396f166d4dbe9985ce7e44379c

    [email protected] - Patch

  • Source reference

    Unverified legacy reference

    URL: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm4-78mm-8v2c

    [email protected] - Exploit, Patch, Vendor Advisory

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.