CVE-2025-7741 Yokogawa Electric Corporation CVE debrief

Who should care

OT/ICS administrators, control-room engineers, and incident responders running Yokogawa CENTUM VP, especially sites using CENTUM Authentication Mode, exposed HIS screen controls, or customized PROG permissions.

Technical summary

The issue is a hardcoded password affecting the PROG user account in CENTUM Authentication Mode. CISA's advisory states that the default PROG permission is S1, equivalent to OFFUSER, so impact is generally limited when permissions remain unchanged. If PROG permissions have been modified, successful login as PROG could permit operations or configuration changes under those elevated rights. The advisory also notes that an attacker must already have access to the HIS screen controls, which constrains exposure.

Defensive priority

Medium: prioritize remediation for affected CENTUM VP systems that use CENTUM Authentication Mode, have accessible HIS screen controls, or have any non-default PROG permissions.

Recommended defensive actions

• For CENTUM VP R5.01.00 through <R5.04.20 and R6.01.00 through <R6.12.00, change the user authentication mode to Windows Authentication Mode per Yokogawa guidance.
• For CENTUM VP R7.01.00, apply patch software R7.01.10.
• Review PROG account permissions and restore the default S1 permission model if it has been changed.
• Restrict and monitor access to HIS screen controls and other operator-facing interfaces to reduce the chance of unauthorized PROG login attempts.
• Follow Yokogawa advisory YSAR-26-0003 and validate the remediation in an engineering/test environment before deploying to production.

Evidence notes

The supplied CISA CSAF advisory for ICSA-26-092-02 states that affected Yokogawa CENTUM VP products contain a hardcoded password for the PROG user account used in CENTUM Authentication Mode. It also states that exploitation requires prior access to HIS screen controls. The advisory further explains that PROG defaults to S1 permission (equivalent to OFFUSER), which lowers the practical impact unless permissions were changed. Remediations in the source corpus include switching affected R5/R6 systems to Windows Authentication Mode and applying R7.01.10 for R7.01.00.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.