CVE-2026-114087 triggerdotdev CVE debrief

Who should care

Defenders responsible for self-hosted trigger.dev deployments should assess exposure and prioritize remediation to prevent potential infrastructure compromise. This includes operators, platform administrators, vulnerability management teams, and security teams who need to verify and remediate vulnerable deployments.

Why it matters

CVE-2026-114087 is significant for defenders responsible for self-hosted trigger.dev deployments, as it allows for unauthenticated infrastructure compromise via forged magic links. The vulnerability requires verification and remediation to prevent potential infrastructure compromise.

• Unauthenticated infrastructure compromise via forged magic links
• Potential for complete infrastructure compromise
• Need for verification and remediation of vulnerable deployments

Technical summary

Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise via forged magic links. The MAGIC_LINK_SECRET is used by [email protected] to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption, allowing attackers to authenticate as any email address without email delivery. User accounts are auto-created when WHITELISTED_EMAILS is not set, which is the default for self-hosted deployments.

Defensive priority

Defenders should prioritize verifying and remediating vulnerable trigger.dev self-hosted deployments, focusing on updating secrets and ensuring proper configuration.

Recommended defensive actions

• Verify and update secrets in self-hosted trigger.dev deployments
• Ensure proper configuration of trigger.dev instances
• Monitor for potential exploitation attempts
• Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
• Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review
• Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented
• Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up

Evidence notes

The vulnerability details are based on the provided source corpus, which includes information from the trigger.dev GitHub repository and the OSV vulnerability database. The source corpus provides evidence of the hardcoded cryptographic secrets in the hosting/docker/.env.example file, including SESSION_SECRET, MAGIC_LINK_SECRET, ENCRYPTION_KEY, and MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET. These secrets are used for authentication and encryption, and an attacker who knows these secrets can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.