CVE-2016-2402 Squareup CVE debrief

Who should care

Teams that ship or depend on OkHttp and rely on TLS certificate pinning for connection integrity, especially applications and services that assume pinning will block interception or transparent TLS inspection.

Technical summary

NVD classifies this as CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation) with CVSS v3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N. The issue is a pinning-bypass logic problem rather than a crypto break: if an attacker can present a certificate chain containing a trusted CA certificate that is not pinned and the pinned certificate, OkHttp may accept the chain. The corpus identifies vulnerable versions as okhttp <= 2.7.3 and okhttp3 3.0.0, 3.0.0-rc1, 3.0.1, 3.1.0, and 3.1.1.

Defensive priority

Medium. The impact is integrity-focused and requires an active network attacker, but the consequence is meaningful because it can defeat an application’s explicit TLS pinning control.

Recommended defensive actions

• Upgrade OkHttp to a fixed release: 2.7.4 or later on the 2.x line, and 3.1.2 or later on the 3.x line.
• Inventory applications and services that use OkHttp certificate pinning so you can prioritize exposed clients and update plans.
• Verify that deployed builds are not using any of the vulnerable okhttp3 releases listed in NVD (3.0.0, 3.0.0-rc1, 3.0.1, 3.1.0, 3.1.1).
• Review application error handling and monitoring for TLS connection failures or unexpected trust behavior after remediation.
• Treat pinning as a defense-in-depth control: keep standard certificate validation healthy and do not rely on pinning alone for broader network security.

Evidence notes

The supplied corpus is internally consistent: the NVD record, CVE description, and vendor/third-party references all describe a certificate-pinning bypass in OkHttp. The official NVD metadata provides the affected version ranges, CVSS vector, and CWE-295 classification. Supporting references include a vendor advisory, technical analysis, and disclosure discussion threads from February 2016. The CVE/public record date supplied here is 2017-01-30; earlier 2016 references in the corpus are disclosure evidence, not the CVE publication date.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.