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PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief

CVE-2026-55581 sonirico CVE debrief

A vulnerability in mcp-shell, a secure MCP server for running shell commands, allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as mcpuser. The issue arises from the default configuration allowing /bin/bash and inadequate validation of command arguments. This problem is resolved in version 0.6.0. The vulnerability is caused by the default Docker security.yaml including /bin/bash in allowed_executables, while security.go validates only the first token and checkBlockedPatternsAndCommands does not reject the shell command-mode flag -c. A caller of the shell_exec MCP tool can provide the command argument `/bin/bash -c <arbitrary-command>`, which passes validation and reaches executor.go,

Vendor
sonirico
Product
mcp-shell
CVSS
HIGH 8.4
CISA KEV
Not listed in stored evidence
Original CVE published
2026-08-25
Original CVE updated
2026-09-09
Advisory published
2026-08-25
Advisory updated
2026-09-09

Who should care

Defenders responsible for mcp-shell deployments should assess exposure and apply the patch. Security teams and system administrators overseeing systems using mcp-shell need to verify their inventory and take action to prevent potential command execution.

Why it matters

CVE-2026-55581 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands on mcp-shell deployments prior to version 0.6.0. Defenders should assess exposure, apply patches, and monitor activity to prevent potential breaches.

  • Potential for attackers to execute arbitrary commands as mcpuser
  • Risk of unauthorized access and data breaches
  • Need for defenders to verify and patch vulnerable deployments
  • Importance of monitoring for unusual activity

Technical summary

The mcp-shell MCP server, prior to version 0.6.0, contains a security flaw allowing attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands. This is due to the default inclusion of /bin/bash in allowed_executables in security.yaml and insufficient validation of command arguments in security.go and executor.go. The vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as mcpuser outside the intended allowlist. The issue is fixed in version 0.6.0. A caller of the shell_exec MCP tool can provide the command argument `/bin/bash -c <arbitrary-command>`, which passes validation and reaches executor.go.

Defensive priority

Defenders should prioritize verifying their inventory of mcp-shell deployments, assessing exposure, and applying the patch from version 0.6.0 as soon as possible.

Recommended defensive actions

  • Verify inventory of mcp-shell deployments
  • Assess exposure to CVE-2026-55581
  • Apply patch from version 0.6.0
  • Monitor for unusual command execution activity
  • Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
  • Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review
  • Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented

Evidence notes

The CVE and NVD records provide details on the vulnerability, its impact, and the fix in version 0.6.0. Official references include GitHub commits, pull requests, and release notes. The vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands as mcpuser outside the intended allowlist. The issue is fixed in version 0.6.0. The default configuration allows /bin/bash and inadequate validation of command arguments. The CVE record was published on 2026-08-25T16:16:55.470Z and has not been modified since then. The NVD record provides a 8

Sources and references

Verified primary and authoritative sources

  • CVE-2026-55581 CVE Program record

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55581

    CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.

  • CVE-2026-55581 NVD vulnerability detail

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55581

    NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.

Supplemental references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.