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PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief

CVE-2026-42004 PowerDNS CVE debrief

CVE-2026-42004 is a vulnerability in DNSdist that allows an attacker to send a crafted EDNS OPT record which, when processed, could lead to the backend seeing EDNS options that were not filtered by DNSdist. This issue has a CVSS score of 3.7, indicating a low severity. The CVE was published on 2026-06-25T13:16:40.547Z and last modified on 2026-10-25T23:10:00.167Z.

Vendor
PowerDNS
Product
DNSdist
CVSS
LOW 3.7
CISA KEV
Not listed in stored evidence
Original CVE published
2026-06-25
Original CVE updated
2026-10-25
Advisory published
2026-06-25
Advisory updated
2026-10-25

Who should care

Defenders responsible for DNS infrastructure, particularly those using DNSdist with EDNS Client Subnet enabled, should assess their exposure and verify configurations. This includes reviewing DNSdist configurations, EDNS Client Subnet settings, and monitoring for unusual EDNS option activity. Security teams and vulnerability management teams should prioritize verification and potential updates to mitigate impacts on DNS service integrity.

Why it matters

CVE-2026-42004 is a low-severity vulnerability in DNSdist that could allow an attacker to bypass filtering rules. Defenders should assess exposure, verify configurations, and prioritize updates to mitigate potential impacts on DNS service integrity.

  • Potential for unauthorized EDNS option processing
  • Need for verification of DNSdist configurations and filtering rules
  • Possible impact on DNS service integrity
  • Requires review of EDNS Client Subnet configurations

Technical summary

The vulnerability allows an attacker to send a crafted EDNS OPT record that will be ignored by DNSdist's filtering rules but rewritten as a valid OPT record when EDNS Client Subnet is inserted. This causes the backend to see EDNS options that DNSdist did not filter. The issue arises from DNSdist's handling of EDNS OPT records and EDNS Client Subnet, potentially allowing unauthorized EDNS option processing and impacting DNS service integrity. Defenders should assess exposure, verify configurations, and prioritize updates to mitigate potential impacts.

Defensive priority

Defenders should assess exposure and prioritize verification of DNSdist configurations, especially those with EDNS Client Subnet enabled.

Recommended defensive actions

  • Assess DNSdist configurations for exposure to crafted EDNS OPT records
  • Verify EDNS Client Subnet configurations and filtering rules
  • Monitor for unusual EDNS option activity
  • Review and update DNSdist to the latest version if necessary
  • Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up
  • Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
  • Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented

Evidence notes

The CVE record and NVD entry provide details on the vulnerability. However, the scope of affected versions and specific remediation steps require verification from official sources. Defenders should verify configurations, review EDNS Client Subnet settings, and assess exposure to crafted EDNS OPT records. Limited source detail suggests explicit evidence-limit language and defensive verification tasks are necessary.

Sources and references

Verified primary and authoritative sources

  • CVE-2026-42004 CVE Program record

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42004

    CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.

  • CVE-2026-42004 NVD vulnerability detail

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42004

    NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.

Supplemental references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.