PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-94083 OISF CVE debrief
A critical vulnerability was found in Suricata before version 8.0.7, leading to an invalid free due to DoH2 type confusion when app-layer.protocols.doh2 is enabled, the default in Suricata 8.x versions. This issue arises from cleanup code for HTTP2 state being executed in HTTP1 state during a DoH2 request with an HTTP1 to HTTP2 upgrade. Defenders and security teams, especially those using Suricata 8.x, should assess exposure and verify updates or patches. The vulnerability's impact and remediation require verification from official sources, considering the default enablement of app-layer.protocols.doh2 in Suricata 8.x and potential for invalid free due to type confusion.
- Vendor
- OISF
- Product
- Suricata
- CVSS
- CRITICAL 9.4
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-09-20
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-09-20
- Advisory published
- 2026-09-20
- Advisory updated
- 2026-09-20
Who should care
Defenders and security teams responsible for Suricata deployments, especially those using Suricata 8.x versions, should assess their exposure and verify the need for updates or patches.
Why it matters
A critical vulnerability in Suricata before 8.0.7 can lead to an invalid free due to DoH2 type confusion. Defenders should verify exposure, especially for Suricata 8.x versions, and assess the need for updates or patches.
- Potential for invalid free due to DoH2 type confusion
- Cleanup code execution for HTTP2 state even in HTTP1 state
- Requires verification of exposure and remediation details
Technical summary
The vulnerability is caused by a DoH2 type confusion in Suricata before 8.0.7, which can lead to an invalid free. This occurs when the cleanup code for the HTTP2 state is executed even though the actual state is HTTP1, specifically when there is a DoH2 request with an HTTP1 to HTTP2 upgrade. The app-layer.protocols.doh2 needs to be enabled for this vulnerability to be exploitable, which is the default setting in Suricata 8.x versions.
Defensive priority
Defenders should prioritize verifying exposure and assessing the need for updates or patches, especially for Suricata 8.x versions where app-layer.protocols.doh2 is enabled by default.
Recommended defensive actions
- Verify Suricata version and configuration to assess exposure
- Review and apply patches or updates for Suricata 8.x versions
- Monitor for official advisories and guidance from Suricata maintainers
- Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
- Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review
- Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented
- Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up
Evidence notes
The CVE record and NVD detail page provide information on the vulnerability, but specific details about exploitation, impact, and remediation require further verification from official Suricata sources.
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
-
CVE-2026-94083 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-94083
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-94083 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94083
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://forum.suricata.io/t/suricata-8-0-7-released/6467
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://github.com/OISF/suricata/commit/e574009add9c208f319e1d9d15b3bb1229c88074
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://github.com/OISF/suricata/compare/suricata-8.0.6...suricata-8.0.7
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.