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CVE-2026-101065 obot-platform CVE debrief

CVE-2026-101065 debrief: Obot platform vulnerable to unauthenticated admin access via exposed Docker quickstart. The Obot platform's Docker quickstart command exposes the container on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication disabled by default, granting full administrative access to unauthenticated parties. Operators and administrators of Obot platform deployments, especially those exposing the service to untrusted networks, should verify and apply authentication settings before exposing Obot to untrusted networks.

Vendor
obot-platform
Product
obot
CVSS
CRITICAL 9.3
CISA KEV
Not listed in stored evidence
Original CVE published
2026-09-27
Original CVE updated
2026-09-27
Advisory published
2026-09-27
Advisory updated
2026-09-27

Who should care

Operators and administrators of Obot platform deployments, especially those exposing the service to untrusted networks, should verify and apply authentication settings before exposing Obot to untrusted networks. This includes reviewing the current configuration, enabling authentication, and restricting access to trusted networks.

Why it matters

CVE-2026-101065 allows unauthenticated administrative access to Obot platform deployments via exposed Docker quickstart. Operators should verify and apply authentication settings before exposing Obot to untrusted networks.

  • Unauthenticated administrative access to Obot API and UI
  • Potential for launching attacker-controlled MCP servers
  • Access to host's Docker control surface via mounted /var/run/docker.sock

Technical summary

The Obot platform's Docker quickstart command exposes the container on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication disabled by default, granting full administrative access to unauthenticated parties. This allows any unauthenticated party who can reach the exposed port to obtain full administrative access to the Obot API and UI, including the ability to register and launch attacker-controlled MCP servers. Because the quickstart also mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the container, the MCP runtime backend reachable this way has access to the host's Docker control surface.

Defensive priority

Operators should verify and apply authentication settings before exposing Obot to untrusted networks

Recommended defensive actions

  • Verify and apply authentication settings for Obot Docker deployments
  • Restrict access to Obot API and UI to trusted networks
  • Monitor for unauthorized access attempts to Obot instances
  • Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up.
  • Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified.
  • Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review.
  • Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented.

Evidence notes

The Obot platform's Docker quickstart command exposes the container on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication disabled by default, granting full administrative access to unauthenticated parties. This configuration allows any unauthenticated party who can reach the exposed port to obtain full administrative access to the Obot API and UI, including the ability to register and launch attacker-controlled MCP servers. Because the quickstart also mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the container, the MCP runtime backend reachable this way has access

Sources and references

Verified primary and authoritative sources

  • CVE-2026-101065 CVE Program record

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-101065

    CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.

  • CVE-2026-101065 NVD vulnerability detail

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101065

    NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.

Supplemental references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.