CVE-2026-79756 nuclio CVE debrief

Who should care

Users of Nuclio versions prior to 1.17.4, especially those with exposed dashboards or untrusted access, should take immediate action to patch or mitigate this vulnerability. This includes restricting access to the Nuclio dashboard to authenticated users and implementing compensating controls, such as monitoring and exception tracking, to detect potential exploitation attempts. Additionally, security teams and vulnerability management teams should review the supplied official advisory or CVE record to validate affected scope, severity, and vendor guidance. Operators and platform administrators should also review the vulnerability details to ensure that their deployments are not exposed to this vulnerability. Security teams should track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented. Monitoring and detection teams should check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review. Asset inventory teams should confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up. Rollback/change windows teams should plan vendor-supported updates or mitigations through normal change control where exposure is confirmed. Source tracking teams should review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified. Compensating controls should be implemented to detect potential exploitation attempts. Asset inventory should be updated to reflect the affected deployments. Security teams should also review the vulnerability details to ensure that their deployments are not exposed to this vulnerability. Security teams should also implement compensating controls, such as monitoring and exception tracking, to detect potential exploitation attempts. Security teams should also track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented. Security teams should also check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review. Security teams should also confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up. Security teams,

Technical summary

Unauthenticated OS command injection in the Nuclio dashboard on the local/Docker platform, allowing for arbitrary command execution via the X-Nuclio-Function-Namespace, X-Nuclio-Project-Namespace, or X-Nuclio-Function-Event-Namespace HTTP headers. The vulnerability exists in Nuclio versions prior to 1.17.4 and has been patched in version 1.17.4. The fix added validateFunctionName for function names and common.Quote() for the named-resource shell command path, but the list-all resource path still interpolates the resourceNamespace parameter unquoted into a /bin/sh -c command string.

Defensive priority

High-priority defensive actions are required to address this vulnerability, as it allows for arbitrary command execution.

Recommended defensive actions

• Inventory Nuclio installations and verify version 1.17.4 or later is deployed.
• Restrict access to the Nuclio dashboard to authenticated users.
• Implement compensating controls, such as monitoring and exception tracking, to detect potential exploitation attempts.
• Apply the patch or upgrade to version 1.17.4 or later.
• Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up.
• Review the supplied official advisory or CVE record to validate affected scope, severity, and vendor guidance.
• Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented.

Evidence notes

Evidence from the CVE Program and NVD suggests that Nuclio versions prior to 1.17.4 are vulnerable to unauthenticated OS command injection. The fix added validateFunctionName for function names and common.Quote() for the named-resource shell command path, but the list-all resource path still interpolates the resourceNamespace parameter unquoted into a /bin/sh -c command string.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.