PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-40093 nimiq CVE debrief
A vulnerability in nimiq-blockchain allows a malicious block-producing validator to set block timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. This directly affects reward calculations via Policy::supply_at() and batch_delay() in blockchain/src/reward.rs, potentially leading to an inflation of the monetary supply beyond the intended emission schedule. The vulnerability impacts the Nimiq Proof-Of-Stake implementation, and defenders should prioritize verifying patch levels and assessing exposure to potential future block timestamp manipulation. The CVE record and NVD entry provide details on the vulnerability, but evidence is limited regarding actual exploitation or specific affected scope.
- Vendor
- nimiq
- Product
- core-rs-albatross
- CVSS
- HIGH 8.1
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-04-09
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-10-26
- Advisory published
- 2026-04-09
- Advisory updated
- 2026-10-26
Who should care
Defenders responsible for Nimiq Proof-Of-Stake implementation, blockchain security, and cryptocurrency systems should assess exposure and prioritize verification of patch levels and potential compensating controls.
Why it matters
CVE-2026-40093 allows malicious block-producing validators to manipulate block timestamps, potentially inflating the monetary supply and impacting reward calculations. Defenders should prioritize verifying patch levels and assessing exposure.
- Potential inflation of monetary supply beyond intended emission schedule
- Manipulation of reward calculations
- Need for verification of patch levels and compensating controls
- Potential impact on trust and stability of the Nimiq blockchain
Technical summary
The nimiq-blockchain library, used in Nimiq's Rust implementation, lacks an upper bound check for block timestamps. This allows a malicious block-producing validator to set timestamps arbitrarily far in the future. The vulnerability directly impacts reward calculations via Policy::supply_at() and batch_delay() in blockchain/src/reward.rs, potentially leading to an inflation of the monetary supply beyond the intended emission schedule.
Defensive priority
Defenders should prioritize verifying the patch level of their Nimiq Proof-Of-Stake implementation and assessing exposure to potential future block timestamp manipulation.
Recommended defensive actions
- Verify the patch level of Nimiq Proof-Of-Stake implementation
- Assess exposure to potential future block timestamp manipulation
- Review and update reward calculation logic to account for potential timestamp manipulation
- Implement compensating controls for exposed systems
- Monitor relevant logs and detection systems for exposed assets
- Track exceptions and retest remediated assets
- Review asset inventory for affected product deployments
Evidence notes
The CVE record and NVD entry provide details on the vulnerability, but evidence is limited regarding actual exploitation or specific affected versions beyond 1.3.0 and earlier. Defenders should verify patch levels, review reward calculation logic, and assess exposure to potential future block timestamp manipulation. Limited evidence exists on the scope of affected deployments or specific exploitation attempts. Official advisories and CVE metadata suggest prioritizing verification of patch levels and compensating controls.
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
-
CVE-2026-40093 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40093
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-40093 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40093
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-49xc-52mp-cc9j
[email protected] - Broken Link
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.