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CVE-2026-32605 nimiq CVE debrief

A vulnerability in the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol implementation allows an untrusted peer to crash a validator by publishing a specially crafted signed tendermint proposal message. This issue was fixed in version 1.3.0. The vulnerability arises from an incorrect bounds check in the ProposalSender::send function, which allows an attacker to trigger an out-of-bounds index panic before signature verification occurs. Validators and nodes using Nimiq Proof-of-Stake should assess their exposure and update to version 1.3.0 if necessary. The issue has been fixed in version 1.3.0, and users are advised to verify their version and apply patches from the vendor.

Vendor
nimiq
Product
core-rs-albatross
CVSS
HIGH 7.5
CISA KEV
Not listed in stored evidence
Original CVE published
2026-04-13
Original CVE updated
2026-10-26
Advisory published
2026-04-13
Advisory updated
2026-10-26

Who should care

Validators and nodes using Nimiq Proof-of-Stake should assess their exposure and update to version 1.3.0 if necessary. Validators may be crashed by an untrusted peer, and nodes may experience denial of service. Version verification and patching are necessary to prevent exploitation. Operators should review and apply patches from the vendor and monitor for similar vulnerabilities in the future.

Why it matters

This vulnerability allows an untrusted peer to crash a validator in the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol, potentially leading to denial of service. Validators and nodes should verify their version and update to 1.3.0 if necessary.

  • Validators may be crashed by an untrusted peer
  • Nodes may experience denial of service
  • Version verification and patching are necessary to prevent exploitation

Technical summary

The Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol implementation has a vulnerability that allows an untrusted peer to crash a validator by publishing a specially crafted signed tendermint proposal message. The issue arises from an incorrect bounds check in the ProposalSender::send function, which allows an attacker to trigger an out-of-bounds index panic before signature verification occurs. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 1.3.0.

Defensive priority

Validators and nodes using Nimiq Proof-of-Stake should verify their version and update to 1.3.0 if necessary.

Recommended defensive actions

  • Verify Nimiq Proof-of-Stake version and update to 1.3.0 if necessary
  • Review and apply patches from the vendor
  • Monitor for similar vulnerabilities in the future
  • Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
  • Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review
  • Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented
  • Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up

Evidence notes

The vulnerability details are based on the NVD entry and the source references provided. The NVD entry and source references indicate that the vulnerability allows an untrusted peer to crash a validator by publishing a specially crafted signed tendermint proposal message. The issue arises from an incorrect bounds check in the ProposalSender::send function. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 1.3.0. Validators and nodes using Nimiq Proof-of-Stake should verify their version and update to 1.3.0 if necessary. The source grounding

Sources and references

Verified primary and authoritative sources

  • CVE-2026-32605 CVE Program record

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-32605

    CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.

  • CVE-2026-32605 NVD vulnerability detail

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32605

    NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.

Supplemental references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.