PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-45410 mauriceboe CVE debrief
TREK collaborative travel planner versions prior to 3.0.18 contain a user enumeration vulnerability via timing side-channel. The login endpoint exhibits a measurable latency difference (~370 ms vs ~10 ms) based on whether a submitted email address exists in the database, caused by bcrypt password comparison being performed only for valid users. This ~14× timing discrepancy allows remote attackers to enumerate registered accounts without authentication, despite identical HTTP status codes and response bodies. The vulnerability is classified as CWE-203 (Observable Discrepancy) and CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy). A fix was released in version 3.0.18.
- Vendor
- mauriceboe
- Product
- TREK
- CVSS
- MEDIUM 5.3
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-05-28
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-05-29
- Advisory published
- 2026-05-28
- Advisory updated
- 2026-05-29
Who should care
Organizations operating TREK collaborative travel planner instances; security teams monitoring for account enumeration techniques; developers implementing authentication systems requiring side-channel resistance
Technical summary
The vulnerability exists in TREK's login flow where the application returns early when a submitted email address is not found in the database (~10 ms response), but performs bcrypt password hash comparison when the email exists (~370 ms response). This observable timing difference of approximately 360 milliseconds enables unauthenticated remote attackers to determine whether arbitrary email addresses are registered in the system. The attack requires no special privileges and can be conducted over the network with standard HTTP requests. The identical HTTP 401 Unauthorized responses and response bodies for both cases prevent detection through content analysis alone, making timing measurement the sole exploitation vector.
Defensive priority
medium
Recommended defensive actions
- Upgrade TREK to version 3.0.18 or later to eliminate the timing side-channel
- If immediate patching is not feasible, implement constant-time authentication responses to prevent timing-based user enumeration
- Monitor authentication logs for patterns consistent with enumeration attempts (rapid sequential login requests with varying email addresses)
- Consider implementing rate limiting on login endpoints to slow potential enumeration attacks
- Review application logs for historical indicators of exploitation attempts prior to patch deployment
Evidence notes
CVE description confirms timing differential of ~370ms for existing users versus ~10ms for non-existing users. GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-3552-3c98-x79r provides vendor acknowledgment and fix version.
Official resources
2026-05-28