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PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief

CVE-2026-15750 mastergo-design CVE debrief

A weakness was identified in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0, impacting the function z.string of the file src/tools/get-component-link.ts of the component mcp__getComponentLink. This weakness can lead to server-side request forgery when manipulating the argument url. The attack may be performed remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used for attacks. However, the project has not responded yet.

Vendor
mastergo-design
Product
mastergo-magic-mcp
CVSS
LOW 2.1
CISA KEV
Not listed in stored evidence
Original CVE published
2026-07-14
Original CVE updated
2026-10-24
Advisory published
2026-07-14
Advisory updated
2026-10-24

Who should care

Defenders and security teams responsible for mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 deployments, especially those with remote access or using the affected component, should assess exposure and prioritize verification.

Why it matters

The weakness in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 can lead to server-side request forgery, allowing remote attacks. Defenders should assess exposure, prioritize verification, and consider compensating controls.

  • Verify if mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 is used in your environment and assess exposure
  • Check if remote access or manipulation of the url argument is possible
  • Monitor for potential server-side request forgery attacks
  • Consider compensating controls or workarounds until vendor remediation is available

Technical summary

The weakness in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 is located in the function z.string of the file src/tools/get-component-link.ts of the component mcp__getComponentLink. Manipulating the argument url can lead to server-side request forgery. The attack may be performed remotely. Defenders should assess exposure and prioritize verification of affected systems, especially those with remote access or using mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0. The exploit has been made public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Defensive priority

Defenders should assess exposure and prioritize verification of affected systems, especially those with remote access or using mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0.

Recommended defensive actions

  • Assess exposure of mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 in your environment
  • Verify if remote access or manipulation of the url argument is possible
  • Monitor for potential server-side request forgery attacks
  • Consider compensating controls or workarounds until vendor remediation is available
  • Review the supplied official advisory or CVE record to validate affected scope, severity, and vendor guidance
  • Plan vendor-supported updates or mitigations through normal change control where exposure is confirmed
  • Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented

Evidence notes

The CVE record and NVD entry provide details on the weakness in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0. However, the vendor has not provided an official response or remediation. Defenders should verify if mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 is used in their environment, assess exposure, and prioritize verification. The exploit has been made public and could be used for attacks. The weakness can lead to server-side request forgery when manipulating the argument url. The attack may be performed remotely.

Sources and references

Verified primary and authoritative sources

  • CVE-2026-15750 CVE Program record

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-15750

    CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.

  • CVE-2026-15750 NVD vulnerability detail

    Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified

    URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15750

    NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.

Supplemental references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.