CVE-2026-64243 Linux CVE debrief

Who should care

Users of the Linux kernel, particularly those using the ASoC: codecs: simple-mux component, should be aware of this vulnerability and take steps to mitigate it. This includes reviewing and updating the ASoC: codecs: simple-mux component configuration, monitoring system logs for potential exploitation attempts, and applying patches from the Linux kernel repository.

Technical summary

The vulnerability is caused by an incorrect enum control bounds check in the simple-mux driver. The simple_mux_control_put() function rejects values greater than e->items, but enum control values are zero-based. For a two-entry mux used by this driver, valid values are 0 and 1, so value 2 must be rejected as well. Accepting e->items can store an invalid mux state, pass it to the GPIO setter, and pass it on to the DAPM mux update path where it is used as an index into the enum text array.

Defensive priority

High priority should be given to patching this vulnerability, as it has a CVSS score of 7.1 and is classified as HIGH severity.

Recommended defensive actions

• Apply the patch from the Linux kernel repository
• Review and update the ASoC: codecs: simple-mux component configuration
• Monitor system logs for potential exploitation attempts
• Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
• Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review
• Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented
• Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up

Evidence notes

The CVE record was published on 2026-07-24T16:16:53.680Z and was last modified on 2026-07-27T05:16:37.283Z. The NVD entry is currently Received. Evidence is limited to public sources and may not reflect the full scope of affected products or potential impacts. Defenders should verify the vulnerability's relevance to their specific environments and review official advisories for detailed guidance.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.