PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-46183 Linux CVE debrief
A use-after-free vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel's DAMON (Data Access MONitor) sysfs interface. The `damon_sysfs_quot_goal->path` field can be read and written by users via the DAMON sysfs 'path' file. While reads for parameter committing to DAMON are protected by `damon_sysfs_lock`, user-driven direct reads and writes were not protected. A writer could deallocate the path-pointing buffer while a reader (using a separate open file) accesses it, resulting in use-after-free. The fix protects both user-direct reads and writes with `damon_sysfs_lock`.
- Vendor
- Linux
- Product
- Unknown
- CVSS
- HIGH 7.8
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-05-28
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-06-11
- Advisory published
- 2026-05-28
- Advisory updated
- 2026-06-11
Who should care
Linux system administrators running kernels with DAMON enabled, particularly on multi-user systems where untrusted users may have access to sysfs interfaces; kernel security teams; organizations using DAMON for memory monitoring in production environments
Technical summary
The DAMON (Data Access MONitor) subsystem in the Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface for configuring monitoring schemes. The `damon_sysfs_quot_goal` structure contains a `path` field that is accessible via the sysfs 'path' file. This field can be read and written by users, and is also read internally when committing {on,off}line parameters to DAMON. While the internal reads for parameter committing were protected by `damon_sysfs_lock`, the user-driven direct reads and writes were not. A race condition exists where a write operation (which calls `kfree()` on the path buffer) can occur concurrently with a read operation from a separate open file descriptor. Although kernfs serializes operations on the same open file, using separate file descriptors for read and write is common. This results in a use-after-free condition when the reader accesses the already-freed buffer. The resolution adds `damon_sysfs_lock` protection around both user-direct reads and writes to prevent this race condition.
Defensive priority
high
Recommended defensive actions
- Apply kernel patches from stable kernel commits referenced in the source corpus to add `damon_sysfs_lock` protection around user-direct reads and writes of `damon_sysfs_quot_goal->path`
- Restrict access to DAMON sysfs interfaces to privileged users only
- Monitor for suspicious access patterns to `/sys/kernel/mm/damon/` sysfs files from unprivileged processes
- Review systems running DAMON-enabled kernels for signs of memory corruption or unexpected behavior
- Prioritize patching on systems where untrusted users have access to DAMON sysfs interfaces
Evidence notes
The vulnerability description is sourced from the official CVE record published 2026-05-28. The fix involves adding `damon_sysfs_lock` protection around user-accessible read/write operations on the `path` field in `mm/damon/sysfs-schemes`. Kernel commit references are provided in the source corpus.
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
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CVE-2026-46183 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46183
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-46183 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46183
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a34ca3e33da4b924c66bcca3729bf68ec5936910
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf3b71421ca00807328c6d9cd242f9de3b77a4bf
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.