PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-45876 Linux CVE debrief
A vulnerability in the Linux kernel's arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) implementation has been resolved. The flaw existed in `arch_set_shadow_stack_status()` where error handling for `alloc_gcs()` was incorrect. The function returns an error-encoded pointer on failure (from `do_mmap()`), not NULL. The original NULL check failed to detect these errors, potentially leading to use of an invalid GCS address. The fix uses `IS_ERR_VALUE()` for proper error detection, consistent with error handling in `gcs_alloc_thread_stack()`. This vulnerability affects the arm64 architecture's shadow stack functionality, which is a security feature designed to protect return addresses from corruption.
- Vendor
- Linux
- Product
- Unknown
- CVSS
- MEDIUM 5.5
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-05-27
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-06-25
- Advisory published
- 2026-05-27
- Advisory updated
- 2026-06-25
Who should care
Organizations running Linux on arm64 architecture with Guarded Control Stack (GCS) enabled should prioritize this fix. System administrators maintaining arm64-based servers, cloud instances, or embedded systems using recent Linux kernels with shadow stack protections should apply updates. Security teams monitoring kernel-level vulnerabilities should track this as part of defense-in-depth for return-oriented programming (ROP) protection mechanisms.
Technical summary
The vulnerability is in the Linux kernel's arm64 Guarded Control Stack (GCS) implementation, specifically in `arch_set_shadow_stack_status()`. The function `alloc_gcs()` returns an error-encoded pointer (from `do_mmap()`) rather than NULL on failure. The original code checked for NULL, which would not catch allocation failures, potentially resulting in use of an invalid GCS address. The fix applies `IS_ERR_VALUE()` to properly detect error conditions, aligning with the error handling pattern used in `gcs_alloc_thread_stack()`. This ensures that GCS allocation failures are properly detected and handled rather than proceeding with an invalid address.
Defensive priority
medium
Recommended defensive actions
- Apply the relevant kernel patches from the stable tree commits once available for your distribution
- Monitor Linux distribution security advisories for kernel updates addressing this issue
- Verify that systems running arm64 with GCS enabled are updated to a patched kernel version
- Review kernel logs for any GCS-related errors that may indicate prior failed allocations
Evidence notes
The vulnerability description indicates this is a resolved Linux kernel issue affecting arm64 GCS (Guarded Control Stack). The fix involves correcting error pointer handling in `arch_set_shadow_stack_status()`. Three kernel.org stable tree commits are referenced. The CVE was published and modified on 2026-05-27. No CVSS score or severity is currently assigned. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV.
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
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CVE-2026-45876 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45876
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-45876 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45876
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/53c998527ffa60f9deda8974a11ad39790684159
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4741114c9622346c4bbb8cc2bbd88153616ffaf
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c787a235deb33be6eda40beee8f561da5fd8cb8c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.