PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-94445 golang.org/x/playground CVE debrief
CVE-2026-94445 was published on 2026-09-25T17:17:19.963Z and has not been modified since then. The NVD entry is currently 8.8 HIGH. A malicious txtar could escape the intended execution context and force arbitrary writes to the playground host's trusted filesystem. Disjointly, one of the three possible paths to invoke go vet on the playground host did not correctly restrict the execution environment. This permitted a Go process to make a read for an environment configuration file rooted in the playground host's $HOME. Together, a well-crafted go env file and the go vet invocation could lead to remote code execution in the playground host itself. This does not affect users of go.dev/play directly; however, it may affect independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground.
- Vendor
- golang.org/x/playground
- Product
- Unknown
- CVSS
- HIGH 8.8
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-09-25
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-09-25
- Advisory published
- 2026-09-25
- Advisory updated
- 2026-09-25
Who should care
Defenders responsible for independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground should assess exposure and prioritize verification and patching. This includes reviewing configurations for txtar and go vet invocations, monitoring for suspicious activity, and ensuring that all necessary security controls are in place. Additionally, defenders should consider performing vulnerability scanning and risk assessments, reviewing and updating incident response plans,
Why it matters
CVE-2026-94445 is a high-severity vulnerability affecting independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground. Defenders should prioritize verification and patching to prevent remote code execution and unauthorized access.
- Remote code execution in the playground host
- Arbitrary writes to the playground host's trusted filesystem
- Read access to environment configuration files
Technical summary
A malicious txtar could escape the intended execution context and force arbitrary writes to the playground host's trusted filesystem. Disjointly, one of the three possible paths to invoke go vet on the playground host did not correctly restrict the execution environment. This permitted a Go process to make a read for an environment configuration file rooted in the playground host's $HOME. Together, a well-crafted go env file and the go vet invocation could lead to remote code execution in the playground host itself.
Defensive priority
Defenders should prioritize verifying and patching independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground, reviewing configurations for txtar and go vet invocations, and monitoring for suspicious activity.
Recommended defensive actions
- Verify and patch independent deployments of golang.org/x/playground
- Review configurations for txtar and go vet invocations
- Monitor for suspicious activity
- Perform vulnerability scanning and risk assessment
- Implement additional security controls
- Review and update incident response plans
- Conduct regular security audits
Evidence notes
The CVE record and NVD entry provide details on the vulnerability, including its description and CVSS score. However, the record does not provide information on known affected versions or exploitation.
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
-
CVE-2026-94445 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-94445
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-94445 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-94445
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
-
Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://go.dev/cl/838485
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://go.dev/issue/81737
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.