CVE-2017-2767 Emc CVE debrief

Who should care

Administrators and security teams responsible for EMC Network Configuration Manager (NCM) deployments, especially versions 9.3.x through 9.4.2.x and any system that exposes the affected Java RMI service to broad network access.

Technical summary

The supplied NVD record for CVE-2017-2767 identifies a network-reachable Java RMI remote code execution vulnerability in EMC Network Configuration Manager (NCM). Affected CPEs in the record include EMC SMarts Network Configuration Manager 9.3, 9.4, 9.4.1, and 9.4.2. NVD maps the weakness to CWE-287 and publishes a CVSS v3.0 vector of AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The source corpus does not include technical root-cause details, proof-of-concept material, or specific remediation steps beyond linked references.

Defensive priority

Urgent. The combination of network exposure, no required privileges, no user interaction, and full confidentiality/integrity/availability impact makes this a high-priority issue for any affected NCM installation.

Recommended defensive actions

• Inventory EMC Network Configuration Manager instances and confirm whether any fall within the affected versions listed by NVD.
• Restrict network access to the NCM service surface, especially any Java RMI-related endpoints, to trusted administrative networks only.
• Apply the vendor remediation or upgrade guidance referenced by the EMC/NVD-linked advisories as soon as possible.
• If compromise is suspected, isolate the host, review authentication and service activity, and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed.

Evidence notes

All statements are grounded in the supplied NVD record and its referenced sources. The record shows publication on 2017-02-03 and last modification on 2026-05-13. The affected versions come from NVD CPE criteria, the CVSS vector is taken from the NVD entry, and the linked references point to EMC-related advisory mirrors and a SecurityTracker entry. No exploit code, weaponized reproduction, or unsupported remediation claims are included.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.