CVE-2016-8217 Dell CVE debrief

Who should care

Teams that still use or embed RSA BSAFE Crypto-J, especially software that imports or validates PKCS#12 files. Security, application, and platform owners should care most if the product handles attacker-controlled PKCS#12 content.

Technical summary

The CVE text states that an attacker who can modify a PKCS#12 file and submit it to the toolkit may attempt to recover the MAC one byte at a time by observing timing differences during MAC verification. NVD maps the weakness to CWE-200 and lists the vulnerable CPE range as dell:bsafe_crypto-j with versions before 6.2.2. The core issue is non-constant-time MAC comparison, which can leak information about the correct MAC.

Defensive priority

Low. The vulnerability is network-reachable in the NVD vector but requires high attack complexity and yields limited confidentiality impact. Prioritize remediation if the product is exposed to untrusted PKCS#12 input or if the affected library remains in production.

Recommended defensive actions

• Upgrade RSA BSAFE Crypto-J to 6.2.2 or later, as stated in the CVE description.
• Inventory applications and services that parse or validate PKCS#12 files with this library.
• Reduce exposure to untrusted PKCS#12 imports where possible until patched.
• If upgrade is not immediately possible, isolate affected components and monitor for unexpected PKCS#12 processing paths.
• Use the linked vendor-advisory references and NVD record to confirm affected product versions in your environment.

Evidence notes

Source corpus states that EMC RSA BSAFE Crypto-J versions prior to 6.2.2 are affected by a PKCS#12 timing attack vulnerability involving non-constant-time MAC comparison. NVD lists CVSS 3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N, CWE-200, and a vulnerable CPE ending before 6.2.2. Published date is 2017-02-03; NVD metadata was modified on 2026-05-13. No KEV entry is present in the supplied corpus.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.