CVE-2026-79785 CVHub520 CVE debrief

Who should care

Defenders and developers using X-AnyLabeling should verify model download security and validate model provenance. They should also review and update incident response plans, perform vulnerability assessment and penetration testing, and implement additional security controls.

Why it matters

CVE-2026-79785 allows potential model substitution and arbitrary code execution due to disabled TLS certificate verification in X-AnyLabeling's model downloader.

• Potential for arbitrary model execution
• Possible model substitution and code execution
• Need for verifying model provenance
• Importance of proper certificate validation

Technical summary

X-AnyLabeling's model downloader disables TLS certificate verification, allowing potential model substitution and arbitrary code execution. The model downloader built a context with ssl._create_unverified_context() and passed it to urllib.request.urlopen, so neither the certificate chain nor the hostname was checked on any model download, and models are fetched over HTTPS from the project's release host. Any party positioned to intercept that connection could therefore answer it with content of their own choosing. For an ONNX target the substituted file passes onnx.checker.check_model and is then used for inference, so the attacker chooses the model that produces the application's annotations.

Defensive priority

Defenders should prioritize verifying model download security and validating model provenance due to potential for arbitrary model execution.

Recommended defensive actions

• Verify model download security and validate model provenance
• Implement proper certificate validation for model downloads
• Restrict model execution to trusted sources
• Monitor for suspicious model download activity
• Perform vulnerability assessment and penetration testing
• Implement additional security controls
• Review and update incident response plans

Evidence notes

Evidence indicates X-AnyLabeling's model downloader disables TLS certificate verification, allowing potential model substitution and arbitrary code execution. The model downloader built a context with ssl._create_unverified_context() and passed it to urllib.request.urlopen, so neither the certificate chain nor the hostname was checked on any model download, and models are fetched over HTTPS from the project's release host. Any party positioned to intercept that connection could therefore answer it with content of their own choosing.

Sources and references

Methodology and review provenance

AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.