PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-79993 Apache Software Foundation CVE debrief
Apache ZooKeeper's `deleteContainer` opcode allows unauthorized deletion of znodes, bypassing ACL restrictions. This issue affects versions 3.9.0-3.9.5 and 3.8.0-3.8.6. Users should upgrade to 3.9.6 or 3.8.7. The vulnerability allows authenticated clients to delete specific znodes in the data tree regardless of ACL restrictions on the znode or its parent. The `deleteContainer` opcode is considered internal-only and the official client doesn't have API for it, but a client that can open a plain TCP session on the ZooKeeper client port (2181 by default) with NO authentication and NO ACL permissions can delete any empty persistent znode.
- Vendor
- Apache Software Foundation
- Product
- Apache ZooKeeper
- CVSS
- HIGH 7.5
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-09-16
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-09-18
- Advisory published
- 2026-09-16
- Advisory updated
- 2026-09-18
Who should care
ZooKeeper administrators and users with znodes requiring ACL protection, as well as security teams and operators managing ZooKeeper deployments. These stakeholders should be aware of the potential for unauthorized deletion of znodes and take steps to verify ACL configurations and upgrade to fixed versions.
Why it matters
CVE-2026-79993 allows authenticated clients to bypass ACL restrictions and delete znodes in Apache ZooKeeper. Users should upgrade to fixed versions and verify ACL configurations to prevent unauthorized deletions.
- Potential unauthorized deletion of znodes
- Bypass of ACL restrictions on znodes
- Possible disruption of dependent applications
- Need for verification of ACL configurations and ZooKeeper versions
Technical summary
The `deleteContainer` opcode in Apache ZooKeeper is processed without verifying the caller's ACL permissions, allowing any authenticated client to delete specific znodes in the data tree regardless of ACL restrictions on the znode or its parent. The opcode is internal-only and not part of the official client API. However, a client with a plain TCP session on the ZooKeeper client port and no authentication or ACL permissions can delete empty persistent znodes. This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.
Defensive priority
Upgrade to fixed versions; verify ACL configurations
Recommended defensive actions
- Upgrade to Apache ZooKeeper version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7
- Verify and restrict ACL configurations for znodes
- Monitor for unauthorized deletion attempts
- Review compensating controls for exposed systems while remediation is scheduled and verified
- Check relevant monitoring, detection, and logs for exposed assets that need extra review
- Track exceptions, retest remediated assets, and close the item only after evidence is documented
- Confirm whether affected product deployments exist in managed environments and assign an owner for follow-up
Evidence notes
The CVE record and NVD entry provide details on the vulnerability and affected versions. The `deleteContainer` opcode (0x14/20) is processed without verifying the caller's ACL permissions. This opcode is considered internal-only and the official client doesn't have API for it. A client that can open a plain TCP session on the ZooKeeper client port (2181 by default) with NO authentication and NO ACL permissions can delete any empty persistent znode (including regular persistent nodes, container nodes, and TTL nodes) by issuing the raw
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
-
CVE-2026-79993 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-79993
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-79993 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79993
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://lists.apache.org/thread/9cw3rmrzhqpct26v8j18fy41bghlq8y5
[email protected] - Mailing List, Vendor Advisory
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.