PatchSiren cyber security CVE debrief
CVE-2026-42588 Apache Software Foundation CVE debrief
Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ on its web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits exec operations on all ActiveMQ MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String). An authenticated attacker can invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter using the 'masterslave://' URL scheme, which can allow loading a Spring XML application context via ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec().
- Vendor
- Apache Software Foundation
- Product
- Apache ActiveMQ Broker
- CVSS
- HIGH 8.1
- CISA KEV
- Not listed in stored evidence
- Original CVE published
- 2026-06-01
- Original CVE updated
- 2026-07-22
- Advisory published
- 2026-06-01
- Advisory updated
- 2026-07-22
Who should care
Organizations running Apache ActiveMQ Classic versions prior to 5.19.7 or 6.0.0-6.2.5 with the web console and Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge enabled. Security teams responsible for messaging infrastructure, Java application security, and Spring Framework deployments should prioritize patching.
Technical summary
This vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Classic stems from improper input validation (CWE-20) and code injection (CWE-94). The Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge, exposed at /api/jolokia/ on the web console, uses a default access policy that permits exec operations on all org.apache.activemq:* MBeans. The BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String) MBean operation accepts a discovery URI parameter that is not sufficiently validated. An authenticated attacker can supply a crafted URI using the masterslave:// scheme with a brokerConfig parameter pointing to a malicious Spring XML configuration. The ResourceXmlApplicationContext loads and instantiates all singleton beans before ActiveMQ validates the broker configuration, enabling arbitrary code execution through bean factory methods like Runtime.exec(). The attack requires authentication to the Jolokia endpoint but results in full remote code execution on the broker JVM.
Defensive priority
critical
Recommended defensive actions
- Upgrade Apache ActiveMQ to version 5.19.7 or 6.2.6 or later, which fixes this issue.
- If immediate patching is not feasible, restrict access to the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ to trusted administrative hosts only.
- Review and harden Jolokia access policies to limit exec operations on ActiveMQ MBeans, particularly BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String).
- Monitor for suspicious requests to /api/jolokia/ containing crafted discovery URIs with masterslave:// or brokerConfig parameters.
- Audit broker configurations for unexpected network connectors or Spring XML application context loads.
Evidence notes
CVE published 2026-06-01. Affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker before 5.19.7 and from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6; Apache ActiveMQ All before 5.19.7 and from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6; Apache ActiveMQ before 5.19.7 and from 6.0.0 before 6.2.6. CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) and CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code/Code Injection) identified by [email protected].
Sources and references
Verified primary and authoritative sources
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CVE-2026-42588 CVE Program record
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42588
CVE Program - Official CVE Program record with source-provided CVE metadata.
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CVE-2026-42588 NVD vulnerability detail
Publisher, destination, and source semantics verified
URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42588
NIST National Vulnerability Database - Official NIST NVD detail page and source-specific vulnerability assessment.
Supplemental references
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Source reference
Unverified legacy reference
URL: https://lists.apache.org/thread/ns0zktfo16s9ql2mmtqtlb6p6xcs45xm
Methodology and review provenance
AI-assisted synthesis based on stored public vulnerability evidence. System validation, approval state, and publication status do not by themselves establish human review of this revision. PatchSiren helps prioritize defensive review and does not prove exposure or remediation on any system.